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Erroneous and Veridical Recall Are Not Two Sides of the Same Coin:  
Evidence From Semantic Distraction in Free Recall 
Abstract   
Two experiments examined the extent to which erroneous recall blocks veridical 
recall using, as a vehicle for study, the disruptive impact of distractors that are semantically 
similar to a list of words presented for free recall. Instructing participants to avoid erroneous 
recall of to-be-ignored spoken distractors attenuated their recall but this did not influence the 
disruptive effect of those distractors on veridical recall (Experiment 1). Using an externalised 
output-editing procedure—whereby participants recalled all items that came to mind and 
identified those that were erroneous—the usual between-sequence semantic similarity effect 
on erroneous and veridical recall was replicated but the relationship between the rate of 
erroneous and veridical recall was weak (Experiment 2). The results suggest that forgetting is 
not due to veridical recall being blocked by similar events.  
 
Keywords: Erroneous Recall, Veridical Recall, Blocking, Semantic Distraction, Forewarning, 
Externalised Free Recall, Source Monitoring. 
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When attempting to retrieve information for recall, what is the role played by the 
presence of similar, but irrelevant, information? Models of recall that rely on a target 
reaching a certain threshold proceed simply on the assumption that items “above” this 
activation or acceptance threshold are recalled, and those that lie below the threshold are not. 
By this logic, erroneous recall should co-vary positively with veridical recall when multiple 
recalls are attempted, as false positives are accepted alongside a greater number of true 
positives whenever the threshold is lowered or relaxed. However, many classical and 
contemporary theories of memory conceive of the process of retrieval rather differently, as 
one of discriminating between targets and similar but task-irrelevant events, whether those 
irrelevant events were actually experienced or internally generated via their association with 
experienced events (Goh & Lu, 2012; Hunt, 2003; Nairne, 2006; Poirier, Nairne, Morin, 
Zimmermann, Koutmeridou, & Fowler, 2012; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Smith, Ward, 
Tindell, Sifonis, & Wilkenfeld, 2000; Watkins & Watkins, 1975; Wickens, Born, & Allen, 
1963). Thus, the ability to retrieve information on the whereabouts of a car parked earlier in 
the day, for example, is a direct function of the extent to which, at retrieval, memory for that 
event is distinguished from memories of other similar but goal-irrelevant events and hence 
ones that are likely to cause interference (e.g., where the car was parked the day before; see 
M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996). One widely-invoked mechanism to explain such 
interference-at-retrieval is associative blocking whereby the perseverative erroneous recall of 
retrieval-cue-matching but ultimately inappropriate events directly impairs access to the 
target event (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; Rundus, 1973; Spitzer & 
Bäuml, 2009). By these accounts, the presence of plausible but task-irrelevant events at 
retrieval should causally—and negatively—influence the recall of targets. Hence, erroneous 
and veridical recall should be negatively related. 
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In the present article, we examine whether veridical recall is indeed determined by the 
tendency for (covert or overt) erroneous recall to block access to target representations by 
systematically overtaxing the discrimination-at-retrieval process: we present, during the 
encoding phase of a free recall task, distractor items drawn from the same semantic category 
as a list of (visually-presented) memoranda and ones that would therefore be expected to 
interfere at retrieval. A critical empirical feature of the setting for present purposes is that 
such distractors result not only in erroneous recall of the distractors (or ‘intrusions’) but also 
a reduction in veridical free recall (Beaman, 2004; Beaman, Hanczacowski, Hodgetts, Marsh, 
& Jones, 2013; Bell, Buchner, & Mund, 2008; Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2008; Neely & 
LeCompte, 1999; Sörqvist, Marsh, & Jahncke, 2010). This double-impact of between-
sequence semantic similarity (B-SSS) is exploited here as a means of examining whether 
veridical recall is impaired as a function of blocking by similar-but-irrelevant events. 
That the failure of recall—or forgetting—is due to the erroneous recall of retrieval-
cue-matching but contextually-inappropriate events blocking access to target events has long 
been a key explanatory construct in memory theory (J. R. Anderson, 1983; Mensink & 
Raaijmakers, 1988; McGeoch, 1942; Rundus, 1973; for an extended discussion, see M. C. 
Anderson & Neely, 1996). To take just two classic examples of the application of the 
blocking construct, in a typical paired-associate learning procedure, unrelated pairs of words 
(e.g., dog-rock) are studied and then presented in a later memory test whereby the cue dog 
can elicit the relevant target response rock. If, in the interim between study and test, re-
pairings are studied (e.g., dog-sky), such that two responses now share a retrieval cue (both 
rock and sky associated with the cue dog), this new learning interferes with memory for initial 
pairings (dog-rock; e.g., Postman, 1971). On the blocking account, this instance of retroactive 
interference results from the perseverative (covert or actual) erroneous recall of the 
competing response (i.e., sky) blocking retrieval of the target rock (e.g., Keppel, 1968; 
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Postman, 1961; Postman & Underwood, 1973; Rundus, 1973). A second phenomenon for 
which a blocking account has been frequently be deployed is part-set cuing inhibition. Here, a 
list of words from each of several (e.g., semantic) categories is presented. If some of the 
exemplars from a studied category are provided as cues at test, recall of noncued exemplars 
of that category is impaired (relative to when no cues are given; Basden, Basden, & 
Galloway, 1977; Todres & Watkins, 1981). On the blocking account, cueing strengthens the 
association between the cued exemplars and the relevant category relative to the association 
between the category and the non-cued exemplars. This relative strength-advantage for cued 
exemplars results in those items intruding persistently, thereby blocking the retrieval of non-
cued items (Rundus, 1973; see also Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; 
Rosen & Engle, 1997; Spitzer & Bäuml, 2009).  
However, in all the foregoing cases, the inference that recall of the contextually-
inappropriate item causes the failure to retrieve the target item is indirect. For instance, in the 
paired associate learning paradigm, when a second-pair response intrudes, it cannot be 
determined with certainty that the intrusion of the second-pair response prevented recall of 
the the first-pair response. Similarly, in part-set cuing inhibition, there is no direct evidence 
that cued items are indeed covertly recalled perseveratively or, even if they are, that this 
causes the impairment in the recall of non-cued items. In each case, the accessibility of the 
desired item(s) may be reduced for reasons other than erroneous recall of the competing 
item(s). Indeed, the indirect nature of the evidence for associative blocking has meant that 
phenomena classically attributed to blocking are also amenable to non-blocking type 
accounts (M. C. Anderson, 2003; M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996; Huddleston & M. C. 
Anderson, 2012; Hulbert, Shivde, & M. C. Anderson, 2012). For example, part-set cueing 
inhibition has been explained without recourse to blocking by supposing that the provision of 
cues leads to the abandonment of a whole-list retrieval strategy in favor of a less effective 
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part-list retrieval strategy (Basden & Basden, 1995; for an alternative non-blocking account, 
see Bäuml & Aslan, 2004). Similarly, retroactive interference in the paired-associate learning 
paradigm has been reascribed to a process in which competing items trigger a competitor-
inhibition process which incurs an overhead cost for target recall (e.g., M. C. Anderson, 
2003; M. C. Anderson & Neely, 1996; see also Postman, Stark, and Fraser’s (1968) notion of 
response-set suppression). 
What is required, therefore, to address the fundamental question of whether erroneous 
recall determines the probability of veridical recall is a setting in which the rates of erroneous 
and veridical recall are both directly observable and, in principle, free to vary orthogonally so 
that any relation that might exist between them can be observed. At first glance, the classic 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm seems to meet this objective. In this paradigm, 
when a list of items (e.g., bed, tired, snore…) is presented, all associated with a critical, non-
presented, word (e.g., sleep), participants tend to erroneously recall that critical lure (Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Thus, the rate at which the critical lure is erroneously 
recalled can be measured independently of the rate of recall for the target items and hence the 
relation between them is also, in principle, discernible. However, the DRM procedure is 
likely to be too blunt a tool for addressing our question because only the erroneous recall (or 
not) of just one critical lure is measured in this case. Indeed, this may account for why a 
variety of erroneous-veridical recall relationships have been observed in this setting:. Some 
studies have shown dissociations between rates of erroneous and veridical recall—i.e., the 
absence of any relation—such as a reduction in erroneous recall in the absence of any change 
in the rate of veridical recall (Hanczakowski & Mazzoni, 2011; McCabe & Smith, 2006; 
Schacter et al., 1999) or veridical recall varying independently of erroneous recall (Schacter, 
Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996; McEvoy & Nelson, 1998; Norman & Schacter, 1997). Other 
studies meanwhile have shown a negative correlation between veridical and erroneous recall 
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(e.g., McDermott, 1996), and still others have shown a positive correlation (e.g., Payne, Elie, 
Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Toglia, 1999).  
In the present study, therefore, we use a distraction procedure in which multiple 
‘lures’ can potentially be erroneously recalled during a free recall task so as to promote the 
chances of observing a relation between erroneous and veridical recall if one exists. In the 
typical semantic distraction study (e.g., Marsh et al., 2008), participants view a visually-
presented list of items that are members of the same category (e.g., Furniture: chair, desk, 
wardrobe…) and are asked to recall them in any order when presented with a ‘recall’ prompt. 
To-be-ignored spoken words (distractors)—that are either taken from the same semantic 
category as the targets (e.g., “table, sofa, bookshelf…”) or from a different semantic category 
(e.g., Professions: “nurse, secretary, carpenter...”)—are presented concurrently with the list of 
targets (or, in some studies, during a retention interval between the last target and a recall 
cue; e.g., Marsh et al., 2008).  
Despite explicit instructions to ignore the distractors and to avoid guessing at recall, 
two deleterious effects on performance are produced. First, erroneous recall—or extra-list 
intrusions—are increased: words presented as semantically-similar distractors are erroneously 
recalled at a greater rate than spontaneous erroneous recall of those words (i.e., when those 
words are not presented as distractors; Beaman, 2004; Bell et al., 2008). Second, B-SSS 
impairs the recall of target items (i.e., reduced veridical recall). One interpretation of these 
two effects is that they reveal the action of associative blocking: it is the erroneous recall of 
the distractors that directly causes the disruptive effect of those distractors on veridical recall 
(Beaman et al., 2013; Hanczakowski et al., 2012). The starting point for this blocking account 
is the uncontroversial notion that in settings in which target-items are related to one another 
(e.g., by semantic category) the shared categorical information is used as a retrieval cue 
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(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).1 The B-SSS effects occur because in the 
semantically-related condition the distractors also match the cue. This distractor-cue match, 
coupled to the fallibility of the capacity to discriminate the environmental source of those 
items (e.g., auditorily- as opposed to visually-presented, e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001), leads to those items being retrieved as 
potential (but inappropriate) candidates for output. Such erroneous retrieval of distractor-
items simultaneously blocks the retrieval of target items, thereby leading also to a decrease in 
veridical recall. Recent support for the blocking account comes from the finding that a single 
factor can beneficially affect both erroneous and veridical recall in this setting. For example, 
using a version of the semantic distraction paradigm in which both targets and distractors 
were spoken, Beaman et al. (2013, Experiment 1) found that promoting the capacity to 
discriminate perceptually between the targets and related distractors by presenting them in 
different voices—targets in a male voice and distractors in a female voice as opposed to all in 
the same voice—resulted both in fewer erroneous recalls and less impairment of veridical 
recall consistent with a “front-end” control mechanism in which recall is enhanced by the 
prevention of the retrieval of incorrect information. This can be contrasted with “back-end” 
control in which control processes edit out incorrect information at a post-retrieval stage 
(Beaman et al., 2013). Critically, front-end control implies a necessary relationship between 
correct (veridical) and false (erroneous) recall, as would be expected if the retrieval of 
erroneous information was acting to impede or block veridical recall.    
                                                 
1 Whilst there was an initial suggestion that the false recalls generated from associatively structured lists and 
categorically structured lists are underpinned by two distinct monitoring mechanisms, one operable at study (for 
associatively structured lists) and one operable at test (for categorically-structured lists; Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, 
& Choi, 2002), false recall for both list structures is similarly modulated by factors such as modality of 
presentation (Pierce, Gallo, Weiss, & Schacter, 2005), blocking of items at study and instruction to generate 
associates (Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009). This coheres with the notion that “associative illusions” 
in the DRM procedure constitute a reflection of semantic gist processing (e.g., Brainerd, Yang, Reyna, Howe, & 
Mills, 2008; see also Knott, Dewhurst, & Howe, 2012). 
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However, co-variation of erroneous and veridical recall does not necessarily indicate 
that the B-SSS effects are underpinned by a single, blocking, mechanism. Other studies have 
shown dissociations between erroneous and veridical recall in this context: Erroneous recall 
is reduced markedly when the related distractors are presented during a retention interval 
between the last target and a recall cue but this has relatively little effect on veridical recall 
(Marsh et al., 2008; Sörqvist et al., 2010). Furthermore, older adults show a more pronounced 
B-SSS on erroneous recall compared to younger adults but not on veridical recall (Bell et al., 
2008). Finally, there is no correlation—either positive or negative—between the extent to 
which an individual shows a B-SSS on erroneous recall and the extent to which that 
individual shows a B-SSS on veridical recall (Marsh et al., 2008). 
Such dissociations between erroneous and veridical recall are more consistent with a 
two-mechanism account of the impact of B-SSS (e.g., Marsh et al., 2008) and with the view 
that erroneous and veridical recall need not co-vary – hence that erroneous recall per se is  
not causally related to the failure of veridical recall and retrieval control processes therefore 
cannot be “front-end”. On the two-mechanism account, whereas the increase in erroneous 
recall is again attributed to use of a semantic-category cue at retrieval coupled with poor 
source-discrimination (as in the single-mechanism account), the impairment of veridical 
recall is thought to be unrelated to erroneous recall. One prominent suggestion is that 
impaired veridical recall reflects competition from the distractors at the point of their 
presentation (hereafter: immediate competition) rather than the retrieval of those distractors as 
potential output candidates at test: Semantically-related distractors interfere with the 
semantic-based encoding and organization processes that are pressed into action to support 
the later retrieval of the target-items (Marsh et al., 2008, 2009). Some of the impairment of 
veridical recall may also be attributable to an overhead cost of inhibiting the distractors as 
they occur, reducing the probability of veridical recall (Marsh, Beaman, Hughes, & Jones, 
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2012; Marsh et al., 2008, 2009; Marsh, Sörqvist, Hodgetts, Beaman, & Jones, 2014). 
Although controversial, support for this immediate competition view comes from a recent 
study by Marsh et al. (2012) using a negative priming procedure (e.g., Tipper, 1985): If the 
target items on trial n are the same as the semantically-related (and hence competitive) 
distractors on trial n – 1, veridical recall is poorer than when there is no relation between the 
distractors and targets across the two trials (see also Marsh et al., 2014). Based on the 
inhibitory account of negative priming (e.g., Tipper, 2001), this reduction in veridical recall 
reflects the fact that the target items had recently been inhibited due to their offering 
immediate competition as distractors on the previous trial.  
In the present study, we address the question of whether erroneous recall determines 
the probability of veridical recall by seeking to determine definitively whether appealing to a 
single (e.g., blocking) mechanism is sufficient to explain the impact of B-SSS on both 
erroneous and veridical recall (e.g., Beaman et al., 2013) or whether, instead, some other 
mechanism must be invoked to explain the reduction in veridical recall (regardless of the 
specific nature of that second mechanism). To preview the logic of the present series, in 
Experiment 1 we introduce for the first time into the semantic distraction setting a technique 
used previously in the context of the DRM false memory paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995): We warned participants about the tendency for erroneously recalling 
items presented as distractors. In line with a dual-mechanism account, we will show that 
whereas forewarning reduces the impact of B-SSS on erroneous recall, it leaves its impact on 
veridical recall unaffected. In Experiment 2, we go on to test a possibility that could 
potentially provide a reprieve for the blocking account: We examine whether the reliance on 
measuring overt erroneous recall in the standard free recall protocol used in Experiment 1—
as well as all previous semantic distraction/free recall studies (e.g., Beaman, 2004; Beaman et 
al., 2013; Bell et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2008; Sörqvist et al., 2010)—might obscure an actual 
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relation between erroneous and veridical recall. Specifically, many instances of erroneous 
recall may be edited out just prior to overt output—and hence remain undetected in the 
standard procedure—and at a point at which they could have already exerted their negative 
impact on veridical recall. In Experiment 2, therefore, we will examine whether, in the usual 
free recall procedure, covert instances of erroneous recall in the face of B-SSS might 
underpin the impairment of veridical recall. 
Experiment 1 
Providing a forewarning about erroneous recall of the critical lure in the DRM 
procedure reduces such erroneous recall (Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 
1997; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; McDermott & Roediger, 1998; Neuschatz, 
Lynn, Benoit, & Payne, 2003; Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005). Whilst this 
reduction does not necessarily affect veridical recall, it would be unsafe to infer that 
erroneous recall does not dictate veridical recall generally. The possibility of finding a 
statistically significant correlation between erroneous recall and veridical recall—negative or 
positive—is undermined by the low number of critical lures that can possibly be recalled in 
this paradigm (one per list). In Experiment 1, therefore, we introduced a forewarning 
manipulation in the context of the semantic distraction (‘multiple-lure’) setting, which is 
more sensitive than the DRM paradigm for investigating the particular research question of 
concern here. The blocking account, or indeed any kind of front-end control based account 
(such as source-constrained retrieval; Jacoby, Kelley & McElree, 1999; Jacoby, Shimizu, 
Daniels & Rhodes, 2005; Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova & Rhodes, 2005), would posit that any 
reduction in erroneous recall of the distractors by the provision of a forewarning should also 
exert a facilitative effect on veridical recall (Beaman et al., 2013; Hanczakowski et al., 2012). 
In contrast, if two-mechanisms are involved in, the B-SSS effect (e.g., Marsh et al., 2008), or 
control processes are entirely “back-end”,  veridical recall should be independent of the 
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degree to which the warning reduces erroneous recall, because these two components of 
performance are underpinned by two distinct mechanisms.  
Method 
Participants. Forty eight students at the University of Central Lancashire participated 
for £6 each. All were native English speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and normal hearing. The participants were randomly divided into two 24-participant 
groups: Warning and No Warning. 
Materials and Design. The experiment was run using E-Prime software. Each 
participant received 18 trials in which they were visually-presented with 15 to-be-
remembered words (targets) all drawn from a single semantic category. Auditory distractors 
were presented synchronously with the targets. Distractors were either all drawn from the 
same category as the targets or all drawn from a different category.   
Targets appeared centrally on the computer screen in black 72-point Times font on a 
white background at a rate of one every 1.5s (750ms on, 750ms inter-stimulus interval; ISI). 
Distractors were presented over stereo headphones at 65dB(A) and at a rate of one every 1.5s 
(750ms on, 750ms ISI). The distractors were digitally recorded in a male voice at an even-
pitch and sampled with a 16-bit resolution at a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz using Sound Forge 
5.  
Fifteen words were chosen from each of 36 semantic categories taken from the Van 
Overschelde, Rawson and Dunlosky (2004) category norms. Items from odd-ranked positions 
in the category-norm lists were assigned to the target lists and items from even positions were 
distractors. The 36 selected categories were first arranged into pairs of unrelated categories 
(e.g., “Fruit-Carpenter’s Tools”). There was one experimental block of 18 trials: 9 related and 
9 unrelated. On the related trials, the auditory distractors were taken from the same category 
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as the targets. On unrelated trials, the distractors were taken from the semantically-unrelated 
category (e.g., “Fruit”) that was paired with the target category (“Carpenter’s Tools”).  
The presentation order of exemplars within each to-be-remembered and distractor 
sequence was random but identical for each participant. Half received a semantically-related 
trial first followed by a semantically-unrelated trial (with trials alternating thereafter between 
related and unrelated). This order was reversed for the other half of the participants. 
Categories were assigned such that, across participants, there was an equal likelihood of each 
category appearing in the unrelated or related condition. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in soundproof booths and were 
seated at a distance of approximately 60 cm from the PC monitor. Participants wore 
headphones throughout the experiment. Participants began by reading standardized 
instructions and were told specifically that they should ignore the distractor words, that they 
would not be asked anything about them during the experiment, and to focus on memorizing 
the visually presented items. The target words were presented one at a time on the computer 
screen. After all 15 targets had been presented the prompt “recall” appeared on the screen. 
Participants then had 60 s to recite, in any order, as many of the target words as they could 
remember. Participants’ oral responses were recorded via microphone input into Audacity 
software (SourceForge). Pressing the space-bar initiated presentation of the next list. One 
practice trial (in quiet) was given at the start of the experiment. 
Participants in the Warning group were told that on some of the trials the distractor 
words would be semantically related to the to-be-recalled words and that these trials were 
designed to elicit erroneous recalls of the distractor words which were never presented 
visually and hence never task-relevant. Participants were encouraged to avoid outputting any 
distractor words. The instructions were made more concrete by the presentation of a trial in 
which an example category (written color-words) were presented as to-be-recalled and 
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distractor words and the participants were told during test which items were the to-be-
recalled were and which were the distractor words. Hence, if warned participants suspected 
that an available word had an auditory origin, it would be veridical to distinguish and 
withhold this word during free recall. 
Results 
Erroneous recall. A response that matched one of the fifteen items from the even 
positions in the Van Overschelde et al. (2004) norms (that were presented as distractors on 
related trials) was scored as an intrusion (i.e., erroneous recall). The same was also done for 
the unrelated condition (in which those items were not presented); this measure of the 
‘spontaneous’ erroneous recall of these items when not actually presented provides the most 
appropriate baseline for assessing the extent to which erroneous recall is exacerbated by the 
actual presentation of the distractor items (see Beaman, 2004; Marsh et al., 2008). Figure 1 
(Panel A) shows the mean number of intrusions for each condition. The rate of erroneous 
recall was clearly greater in the related compared to unrelated condition but this difference 
was attenuated dramatically in the Warning group.  
A 2 (Warning) × 2 (Target-Distractor Relation) ANOVA of the intrusion data 
revealed a main effect of Target-Distractor Relation, F(1, 46) = 50.25, MSE = 3.95, p < .001, 
p2 = .52, a main effect of Warning, F(1, 46) = 5.83, MSE = 12.60, p = .02, p2 = .113, and a 
significant interaction between these two factors, F(1, 46) = 14.45, MSE = 3.95, p < .001, p2 
= .24. A simple effects analysis (LSD) revealed that intrusions were more frequent in the 
related condition than in the unrelated condition for both the No Warning (p = .025; CI.95 = 
.179, 2.49) and Warning (p < .001; CI.95 = 3.26, 5.57) groups. More importantly, the Warning 
group produced significantly fewer intrusions in the related condition compared to the No 
Warning group (p = .002; CI.95 = 1.27, 5.32), while there was no significant difference 
between the groups in the unrelated condition (p = .73, CI.95 = -1.01, 1.43).  
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Veridical recall. Recall of the target items was scored according to a free recall 
criterion: Each target (i.e., visually-presented) item recalled was scored as veridical 
regardless of its position. As can be seen in Figure 1 (Panel B), the basic effect of B-SSS on 
veridical recall was replicated: target items were recalled less well in the related compared to 
unrelated condition. Most importantly, whereas forewarning strongly modulated the impact 
of semantic similarity on erroneous recall, this did not in turn affect veridical recall: Whilst 
there was a large and specific effect of forewarning on erroneous recall of related distractors, 
there was a small (and non-significant; see below) non-specific effect of forewarning on 
veridical recall (i.e., regardless of Target-Distractor relation). 
A 2 (Warning: Warning versus No Warning) × 2 (Target-Distractor Relation: Related 
versus Unrelated) ANOVA of the target-recall data revealed a main effect of Target-
Distractor Relation, F(1, 46) = 54.90, MSE = 0.002, p < .001, p2 = .54, but no main effect of 
Warning, F(1, 46) = .725, MSE = 0.009, p = .399, p2 = .02, and no interaction between these 
two factors, F(1, 46) = .109, MSE = 0.002, p = .74, p2 = .002.  
Relation between veridical and erroneous recall. There were also no significant 
correlations between the number of intrusions and the probability of veridical recall 
regardless of distractor-relatedness or Warning group, r(22) = -.17, p = .42, related condition, 
no warning; r(22) = .127, p = .56, unrelated condition, no warning; r(22) = .13, p = .54, 
related condition with warning; r(22) = -.26, p = .22, unrelated condition, no warning).  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 showed that a forewarning about the tendency to erroneously recall 
semantically-related auditory distractors during free recall reduces substantially the 
propensity for such erroneous recall. The result resonates with that found in the DRM task in 
which a critical lure is less likely to be falsely recalled when participants are forewarned that 
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such erroneous recall tends to occur (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 1999; McCabe & Smith, 2002; 
Watson et al., 2005). Of particular significance for present purposes is the finding that while 
warning reduced erroneous recall, this did not in turn affect veridical recall. Furthermore, 
regardless of condition, there was no correlation between the rate of erroneous recall and the 
accuracy of veridical recall. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 more clearly support back-end 
over front-end control and a two-mechanism account (Marsh et al., 2008), which ascribes the 
effects of B-SSS on erroneous and veridical recall to distinct mechanisms, over a single-
mechanism account in which the reduction in veridical recall is caused by distractors 
blocking the retrieval of target items.. The data also go against the possibility that veridical 
and erroneous recall are both direct consequences of a single response bias or threshold at 
output (cf. signal detection theory; e.g., Banks, 1970). More generally, the results of 
Experiment 1 are in line with the broader view that erroneous recall is not a key determinant 
of veridical recall (e.g., M. C. Anderson, 2003). 
 However, to conclude that the absence of a relation between the impact of B-SSS on 
erroneous and veridical recall as observed in Experiment 1 undermines the blocking account 
may be premature. First, there are known logical and statistical problems in drawing 
conclusions from an absence of evidence, even though a dual mechanism might seem the 
most plausible of the alternatives given the results obtained. Second, it remains possible that a 
blocking effect of erroneous recall on veridical recall does indeed account for the disruptive 
effect of B-SSS on veridical recall but, in the standard free recall procedure, this does not 
manifest empirically in the participants’ recall protocols. Specifically, many instances of 
erroneous recall may remain unobserved because they are edited out by the participants prior 
to overt responding (Hunt, Smith, & Dunlap, 2012; Kahana et al., 2005). If so, this could 
result in an underestimation of erroneous recall and hence, potentially, explain the failure to 
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observe the systematic relation between erroneous and veridical recall predicted by the 
blocking account. Experiment 2 was designed to examine this possibility. 
Experiment 2 
The key conclusion from Experiment 1—that the impact of B-SSS on erroneous recall 
is not related to its effect on veridical recall—seems to apply when erroneous recall is defined 
as overt output of distractor items. However, ‘erroneous recall’ could instead be defined less 
restrictively as items that enter consciousness and become available for output during test 
regardless of whether they are actually output. To date, articulations of the blocking account 
have tended to emphasize the fallibility of “front-end control” aspects of the retrieval process. 
Front-end control—an example of which is source-constrained retrieval (e.g., Jacoby, 
Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005)—operates by focussing retrieval such that it is mainly 
information from the desired source that comes to mind during test. This is achieved by 
reinstating the source context that specifically fits the way in which target information was 
encoded, and thereby potentially limits the accessibility of undesired information. In other 
words, the retrieval of targets is facilitated and potential intrusions are prevented from 
coming to mind during the test phase of the task. Hence, front-end control is often referred to 
as a pre-retrieval process. An example of the operation of front-end control in the present 
setting would be to constrain search to items whose visual properties (e.g., orthography) were 
utilised during the encoding episode thereby preventing irrelevant spoken items from coming 
to mind at test. Imperfect operation of such front-end control leads to the retrieval of 
distractor-items, thence to erroneous recall and finally to the blocking of access to target-
items (resulting in poorer veridical recall; see discussion by Beaman et al., 2013).  
However, it is also commonly accepted that there are “back-end control” mechanisms 
such as the distinctiveness heuristic (Dodson & Schacter, 2002) or recollection rejection 
(Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003) that operate subsequent to (covert) retrieval but 
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before output to assess the appropriateness of outputting a given item (e.g., Halamish, 
Goldsmith, & Jacoby, 2012). Once (covertly) retrieved, an item—or its associated features—
is evaluated in terms of whether it can be differentiated as a target or an intrusion (e.g., an 
item presented as a distractor; Budson et al., 2005). An example of back-end control would 
be to covertly generate items presented as distractors but then edit the item after it has been 
retrieved on the basis of an assessment of the features associated with the item (e.g., modality 
information; recall of auditory information and/or failure to recall visual information).  
Importantly, the possible existence of back-end control mechanisms means that 
whereas there may not be a relation between overt erroneous recall and veridical recall (cf. 
Experiment 1), a relation may indeed exist between erroneous and veridical recall if covert—
and not just overt—instances of erroneous recall are taken into account. Such a relation 
would clearly provide a reprieve for the blocking account. Specifically, the account could 
posit that covert retrieval of items presented as distractors (or ‘covert erroneous recall’) 
blocks the retrieval of target items regardless of whether such covert erroneous recall 
translates into overt erroneous recall. In short, using only the rate of overt erroneous recall—
as measured in Experiment 1 and all previous studies of the B-SSS effect—may obscure a 
true relation between erroneous recall (covert or overt) and veridical recall. 
What is required for a fairer test of the blocking account, therefore, is a means of 
assessing the extent to which erroneous recall in the face of B-SSS is related to the level of 
veridical recall regardless of whether that erroneous recall is overt or covert. To do this, we 
used a modified externalised free recall editing technique (Bousfield & Rosner, 1970; Kahana 
et al., 2005; Roediger & Payne, 1985; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Unsworth & Brewer, 2010). 
Here, participants are encouraged to overtly produce any word that enters consciousness 
during test, be it a previously produced response or an intrusion, but they are instructed to 
press a button if they recognize the item as a repetition or intrusion (Kahana et al., 2005; 
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Unsworth & Brewer, 2010). Participants are thus encouraged to use back-end control to 
monitor and edit the output of each item after the response has been output. In the present 
context, then, this technique should enable us to infer the extent to which, in the standard 
(i.e., non-externalized) free recall task, semantically-related distractors are subject to covert 
erroneous recall but edited out before output. In turn, this will allow us to assess whether the 
impact of B-SSS on veridical recall is indeed related to the rate of (covert or overt) erroneous 
recall as predicted by the blocking account. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty Cardiff University students participated for course credit. All 
were native English speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal 
hearing. 
Materials, design, & procedure. The remaining aspects of the method were the same 
as for Experiment 1 with the exception that participants were instructed to output any word 
that came to mind during the test phase and there was no warning manipulation. However, 
participants were also told that if a word that they had just output had not been a visually-
presented to-be-recalled item they were to classify it as an intrusion by pressing a key on the 
desk in front of them immediately after outputting the word but prior to outputting any 
further items. Participants’ oral responses were recorded via microphone input into Sound 
Forge 5 software (Sonic Inc., Madison, WI; 2000).  
Results and Discussion 
The B-SSS effect on erroneous and veridical recall. Experiment 2 replicated the 
typical B-SSS effect on erroneous recall (Table 1): Erroneous recall was greater in the related 
condition than in the unrelated condition, t(19) = 5.63, p < .001, CI.95 = 0.67, 1.46, and this 
was the case regardless of whether those erroneously recalled items were correctly classified 
as intrusions (i.e., hits)1, t(19) = 3.12, p = .006, CI.95 = 0.19, 0.96, or not classified as 
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intrusions (i.e., misses), t(19) = 3.51, p = .002, CI.95 = 0.11, 0.43. The results also showed the 
typical B-SSS effect on veridical recall (Table 1). In a first step, all targets that were output 
(regardless of their subsequent classification) were scored as correct. Overall, recall was 
worse in the related condition compared with the unrelated condition, t(19) = 2.45, p = .024, 
CI.95 = 0.07, 0.95. Veridical recall was also impaired in the related condition when only 
targets that were correctly rejected as not being intrusions (i.e., correct rejections) were 
considered, t(19) = 4.03, p < .001, CI.95 = 1.19, 0.38. Table 1 also reports the rest of the data 
for the sake of completeness. 
Relation between erroneous and veridical recall. If erroneous recall blocks 
veridical recall, there should be a negative correlation between erroneous recall— 
regardless of whether it was covert or overt—and veridical recall. That is, in the related 
condition, the more distractor items that come to mind the fewer the number of targets that 
should be produced. On the other hand, if erroneous recall and veridical recall are 
underpinned by functionally distinct mechanisms, we should find no correlation between 
them. As can be seen in Figure 2, there was no significant correlation between non-edited 
erroneous recall and veridical recall, r(18) = .06, p = .802. As this conclusion rests on 
acceptance of the null hypothesis, and the sample size was relatively small, we also report the 
Bayes statistic for this result (http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor), because it can, unlike 
conventional statistics, quantify the support for the null hypothesis based on the obtained 
data. The JZS Bayes factor for the correlation between erroneous recall and veridical recall 
was 5.84. Values above unity are in favor of the null hypothesis, whereas values below unity 
are in favor of the alternative. A value of 5.84 is considered ‘substantial evidence in favour of 
the null-hypothesis’ (Jeffreys, 1961). 
 Experiment 2 replicated the typical B-SSS effect on erroneous and veridical recall. 
There is no evidence in the results obtained here that the process of non-target items coming 
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to mind blocks the retrieval of targets. The findings instead provide evidence for the view that 
there is no relation between erroneous and veridical recall and that front-end control plays no 
role in this process. Although we acknowledge that the sample size of Experiment 2 was 
relatively small, the Bayesian analysis, combined with the consistency with the results of 
Experiment 1, bolster our confidence in this conclusion. Taken together, our results suggest 
that the B-SSS effect on erroneous recall and that on veridical recall are underpinned by 
distinct mechanisms. 
General Discussion 
To summarize the results of the present study, we showed that the impairment in the 
ability to free-recall a list of words due to the presence of semantically-related distractors is 
independent of the propensity to erroneously recall those distractors: The effect of 
semantically-related distractors persists even when erroneous recall is drastically reduced by 
a forewarning about the propensity for such recall (Experiment 1) and there is no relation 
between erroneous and veridical recall even when participants are encouraged to output all 
items that come-to-mind prior to classifying them according to whether or not they were 
intrusions (Experiment 2). These results are at odds with the use of front-end control and 
falsify a single-mechanism (blocking) account positing that retrieval of target items is 
disrupted by semantically-related distractors because erroneous recall of those distractors 
blocks access to target items. If this were the case, the effect of related distractors on veridical 
recall should be attenuated when erroneous recall is constrained, and the rate of erroneous 
recall should be negatively associated with the rate of veridical recall. Instead, the results 
support a two-mechanism account (Marsh et al., 2008) in which the B-SSS effect on 
erroneous recall and on veridical recall occurs for different reasons. By extension, the present 
findings suggest more generally both that erroneous and veridical recall are not positively 
associated in any simple way such that recall of either simply depends on a common 
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threshold of acceptance and that forgetting is not driven to any appreciable extent by 
erroneous recall of similar but contextually-inappropriate events, contrary to several theories 
of memory (e.g., J. R. Anderson, 1983; Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988; Raaijmakers & 
Shiffrin, 1981; Rundus, 1973). 
Consequences of the Dissociation between Erroneous and Veridical Recall. 
On current accounts of semantic distraction, the erroneous recall component of the 
impact of B-SSS is attributed to the breakdown of source monitoring (Beaman, 2004; Bell et 
al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2008). Some of the distractor items—those not successfully inhibited 
during their presentation (see later discussion of the second mechanism in the two-
mechanism account)—come to mind at test and undergo a monitoring process to determine 
whether or not they are appropriate for output. That a forewarning about the propensity for 
erroneous recall of distractors dramatically reduces such recall suggests that it can be 
prevented via back-end control, but is inconsistent with the notion of front-end control under 
these circumstances. This resonates strongly with findings from the DRM procedure in which 
a warning about false recall of a single critical lure—a non-presented item strongly associated 
with target items—reduces recall of that lure (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Watson et al., 
2005). According to this source-monitoring view, non-target items can potentially be edited 
out through a strategy of examining, post retrieval, the details that differentiate the non-target 
item from target items (see Budson et al., 2005).  
Typically, to examine the selection of targets from a “consideration set” of 
possibilities (Beaman, 2013), manipulations are implemented that impact on the 
discriminability of target and distractor items (e.g., Beaman et al., 2013). In the study 
reported here, output monitoring processes were manipulated by means of instruction alone, 
and the dimension along which targets could be discriminated from distractors (modality) 
remained unchanged. The finding that a mere instructional manipulation—forewarning—
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influences erroneous recall, suggests that in this case the observed reduction in erroneous 
recall is unlikely to be due to changes in front-end control. This is because this form of 
control operates by focussing retrieval such that it is mainly information from the desired 
source (e.g., visual properties such as orthography) that is used to prevent irrelevant spoken 
items from coming to mind during test (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2005). However, if front-end 
control was operating, then erroneous and veridical recall should be two sides of the same 
coin: factors that increase the effectiveness of front-end discrimination, like physical (non-
semantic) discriminability of relevant and irrelevant information, should lead to both fewer 
instances of erroneous recall and improved veridical recall (Beaman et al., 2013). A note of 
caution must be added here since we cannot exclude the possibility that participants, having 
been given a sample trial in the forewarning condition, focused on the orthographic 
information at study during the experimental trials to aid discrimination of targets and 
distractors via front-end control. Although there was a tendency for forewarning to reduce 
veridical recall in Experiment 1, as might be expected if maintenance of the warning cue 
acted as a load (cf. Watson et al., 2005), this did not reach significance and further suggests 
that erroneous recall was reduced by back- rather than front-end control. Thus, one way to 
account for the finding that increasing the discriminability of targets from distractors (via 
differences in voice or color) can affect both veridical and erroneous recall (Beaman et al., 
2013) is to propose that the physical distinction facilitates the identification of the distractors 
as such at the point at which they occur thereby facilitating the exclusion of inappropriate 
information at encoding rather than retrieval.  
Regardless of whether or not instances of erroneous recall are successfully edited out 
via back-end control, the present findings suggest strongly that these recalls do not determine 
the probability of veridical recall, contrary to predictions derived from the construct of 
associative blocking (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; Rundus, 1973; 
Erroneous and Veridical Recall       24 
 
Spitzer & Bäuml, 2009). The two-mechanism account proposes that veridical recall is 
impaired by distractors because they compete at the time of their presentation for the 
semantic-based processes supporting performance of the focal task (Marsh et al., 2008, 
2009). To counteract this competition, related distractors are subject to an inhibitory process 
as they occur. Whilst the net result is the facilitation of selective attention of the target items, 
the process incurs some overhead cost, diminishing the accessibility, at test, of targets sharing 
features with the distractors (Marsh et al., 2008, 2009, 2012, 2014; see also Jones, Marsh, & 
Hughes, 2012). Whilst the present study was not designed to garner direct evidence for this 
competition-at-presentation/inhibition view, as noted in the Introduction, it enjoys support 
from the finding that the free recall of items that have recently been distractors is impaired a 
result described as ´negative priming`; Marsh et al., 2012). Recent evidence suggests further 
that the disruption of veridical recall may differ depending on individual differences in 
working memory capacity (WMC): veridical recall of those low in WMC (and hence low 
distractor-inhibition ability; Conway et al., 2001; Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & Engle, 1999) is 
impaired to a greater extent than that of participants with high WMC. Those with high WMC 
do, however, show a greater negative priming effect than those with low WMC (Marsh et al., 
2014). Since in Experiment 2 of the current series, the impact of B-SSS also manifested in an 
increased number of targets incorrectly classified as intrusions, retrieval discriminability 
clearly plays a role in reducing the number of correct (target) items incorrectly rejected 
before output, a result that reduces veridical recall independently of any other hypothetical 
control device or any impact of blocking (see also Beaman, Hanczakowski & Jones, 2014, for 
complementary findings).  
Is there a Role for Attentional Capture? 
Evidence has been provided for a two-mechanism account of semantic auditory 
distraction, however the exact processes operating in relation to the disruption of veridical 
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recall remain open for debate. It is possible that some of the disruptive effect of semantically-
related speech on free recall may be due to attentional capture or attentional slippage 
whereby the distractors draw scarce attentional resources away from the encoding of the 
target items (cf. Cowan, 1995). There is again the possibility that attentional capture could 
affect veridical and erroneous recall in different ways. One possibility is that intrusions may 
be due (in part) to either attentional slippage or attentional leakage (semantic processing of 
irrelevant material whilst attention is focused elsewhere; Lachter, Forster, & Ruthtuff, 2004; 
this may be synonymous with the view of immediate competition assuming that semantic 
processing of the distractors at the point of their presentation leads to their competition with 
targets).  
Erroneous recalls may be caused by attentional slippage during study: Orientation of 
attention toward the distractors could result in the distractors being automatically encoded 
along with the target items. Moreover, if activation of the items per se (in the absence or 
failure of source-monitoring) is used to determine list membership, then this automatic 
encoding could feasibly result in the output of the distractors during test. For example, in a 
shadowing task in which participants continuously repeat aloud a message presented to one 
ear while ignoring another message presented to the other ear, about a third of participants 
hear their own name in the to-be-ignored channel. A potential consequence of attentional 
slippage, however, is presumably a greater analysis of the distractor, allowing for modality 
information to be encoded and thereafter used—if instructed to do so (e.g., via 
forewarning)—to edit the item post-retrieval. Perhaps it is no coincidence that participants 
with high WMC who are less likely to make shadowing mistakes, or hear their name at the 
time it is presented, in the to-be-ignored channel in the context of dichotic listening (Conway 
et al., 2001) also make fewer intrusions of related spoken distractors in the semantic 
distraction task (Beaman, 2004).Arguably, individuals with high WMC show stronger 
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inhibition of information in a task-irrelevant auditory channel (Marsh et al., 2014; Sörqvist, 
Rönnberg, & Stenfelt, 2012). 
The other purely attentional possibility, processing of distractors via attentional 
leakage is known to occur (e.g., Scott, Rosen, Beaman, Davis & Wise, 2009), but it seems 
unlikely to facilitate the editing process in the same way. It is also unclear why any form of 
attentional capture, if responsible for erroneous recall, would leave veridical recall untouched 
as would be required by the dissociation between erroneous and veridical recall observed 
here, especially as sound that captures attention disrupts target recall in the context of serial 
short-term memory (e.g., Hughes, Vachon, & Jones, 2005, 2007; Hughes, Hurlstone, Marsh, 
Vachon, & Jones, 2013; Sörqvist, 2010). Because of this, we favor the view that a breakdown 
of source monitoring at recall rather than attentional capture at study underpins the erroneous 
recall component of the B-SSS effect. 
 
A Functional View of Forgetting 
More broadly, the present findings are in line with a functional approach to forgetting  
that emphasizes the role of conceptually-focused selective attention (M. C. Anderson, 2003; 
M. C. Anderson & Huddleston, 2012) and monitoring processes in establishing successful 
remembering (Marsh et al., 2008, 2012, 2014). This view eschews the idea that forgetting is 
attributable to passive factors such as decay, interference (e.g., overwriting), or context 
change. Rather, forgetting is not considered in terms of a negative outcome, but as a 
consequence of active processes that serve important attentional functions. The notion of a 
conceptually-focused selective attention holds that selective retrieval requires similar 
processes to perceptually focused selective attention whereby one object has to be selected 
from an array of others that receive activation in parallel via perceptual input (Houghton & 
Tipper, 1994). For conceptually-focused selective attention, these objects may no longer be 
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within the external world (such as images, facts or prior episodes). Here, attention is shifted 
across objects internally to allow attentional refocusing on the target object for mnemonic 
retrieval. When more than one object shares a retrieval cue such as the taxonomic cue 
“Fruit”, many representations of “Fruit” will receive activation in parallel from the cue, only 
one of which may be the target for memory retrieval, the remainder non-targets 
(distractors/competitors). Selectively attending to the target entails isolation of the target 
representation from non-target representations. According to the conceptually-focused 
selective attention view, inhibition is the key process used to resolve this computational 
problem of selection by deactivating the mental representations of these competitors thus 
rendering them non-interfering and allowing the target memory to be retrieved (Anderson & 
Weaver, 2009). This cognitive control mechanism that responds to unwanted competition 
from related memories is functional in that it allows contextually appropriate responses—that 
are often weaker than the unselected alternatives—to be retrieved thereby overriding 
responses that are often prepotent. The result of this suppression, however, is that it carries a 
negative consequence for the later recall of the competing, non-target, memories should they 
then become the targets for selective retrieval (M. C. Anderson, 2003). That omissions of 
veridical recalls were unrelated to incidence of erroneous recall in the present study 
challenges passive theories of forgetting that are based on the constructs of decay or blocking 
(as we have focused on here). The present findings cohere better with the view that 
distractors compete with targets for retrieval and that active control processes are  required to 
prevent or reduce competition (M. C. Anderson, 2003). Impairment in veridical recall is not 
related to the degree to which distractors are erroneously recalled at retrieval but rather to a 
cost of the immediate competition offered by those distractors during their presentation and 
the inhibitory process deployed to reduce that competition (Marsh et al., 2008, 2012, 2014). 
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 In conclusion, the results reported here suggest that the B-SSS effect on veridical and 
erroneous recall is underpinned by two distinct mechanisms—one that is associated with 
disruption of veridical recall and one that is associated with production of erroneous recall—
that are differentially sensitive to modulation by top-down knowledge about the tendency for 
erroneous recall. Forewarning seems to modulate the erroneous recall component through the 
process of back-end cognitive control, a monitoring process that–unlike front-end control–
does not influence veridical recall. Although processes relating to discrimination may also 
influence veridical recall, the disruption to veridical recall seems to be related to the direct 
competition between targets and distractors as they occur rather than activation-blocking 
(Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; Rundus, 1973).  
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Footnote 
1. Whilst it may seem more intuitive to think of the successful identification of an intrusion 
as an intrusion as a correct rejection, this would technically be incorrect. The ‘signal’ in this 
case (cf. signal detection theory) is an intrusion and hence to classify one as such is a hit and 
failure to classify it as such is a miss. To not classify a target-word as an intrusion is thus a 
correct rejection and to classify a target-word as an intrusion is a false alarm. 
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Figures and Table captions 
 
Figure 1. Panel A: Mean number of related-speech intrusions (for the unrelated and related 
speech trials in the no-warning and warning conditions) of Experiment 1. Panel B: Proportion 
of correct responses (i.e., for unrelated and related speech trials in the no-warning and 
warning conditions) of Experiment 1. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 2. The (absence of) a relation between non-edited veridical recall and erroneous recall 
in the related condition of Experiment 2. 
 
Table 1. The table shows for the unrelated and related sound conditions of Experiment 2 the 
means (M) and standard errors (SE) for the number of times per list a distractor-item was 
output (overt erroneous recall) and also whether that item was classified as an intrusion (i.e., 
a hit), or not classified as an intrusion (i.e., a miss). The table also shows the number of times 
per list a target-item was output (veridical recall) and also whether it was not classified as an 
intrusion (i.e., a correct rejection) or classified as an intrusion (i.e., a false alarm). 
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Figure 2 
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Table 1 
 Condition 
                  Unrelated Related 
Dependent variable M           SE M SE 
Erroneous recall 
No. of distractors output regardless of their   0.95                                              
classification 
 
0.19 
 
 
2.01 
 
0.32 
Classified as an intrusion (Hits) 
Not classified as an intrusion (Misses)  
 
0.69     
0.25 
0.16 
0.06 
1.26 
0.75 
0.29 
0.11 
     
Veridical Recall  
No. of targets output regardless of their         8.48                                                                    
classification 
                                            
         0.21 
                                                             
7.97  0.23 
Classified as not an intrusion (Correct 
rejections)  
8.23 0.19 7.45 0.20 
Classified as an intrusion (False 
alarms) 
0.25 0.06 0.52 0.12 
 
 
